Network Working Group S. Kent
Request for Comments: 2401 BBN Corp
Obsoletes: 1825 R. Atkinson
Category: Standards Track @Home Network
November 1998
Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol
Status of this Memo
This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1998). All Rights Reserved.
Table of Contents
1. IntrodUCtion........................................................3
1.1 Summary of Contents of Document..................................3
1.2 Audience.........................................................3
1.3 Related Documents................................................4
2. Design Objectives...................................................4
2.1 Goals/Objectives/Requirements/Problem Description................4
2.2 Caveats and Assumptions..........................................5
3. System Overview.....................................................5
3.1 What IPsec Does..................................................6
3.2 How IPsec Works..................................................6
3.3 Where IPsec May Be Implemented...................................7
4. Security Associations...............................................8
4.1 Definition and Scope.............................................8
4.2 Security Association Functionality..............................10
4.3 Combining Security Associations.................................11
4.4 Security Association Databases..................................13
4.4.1 The Security Policy Database (SPD).........................14
4.4.2 Selectors..................................................17
4.4.3 Security Association Database (SAD)........................21
4.5 Basic Combinations of Security Associations.....................24
4.6 SA and Key Management...........................................26
4.6.1 Manual Techniques..........................................27
4.6.2 Automated SA and Key Management............................27
4.6.3 Locating a Security Gateway................................28
4.7 Security Associations and Multicast.............................29
5. IP Traffic Processing..............................................30
5.1 Outbound IP Traffic Processing..................................30
5.1.1 Selecting and Using an SA or SA Bundle.....................30
5.1.2 Header Construction for Tunnel Mode........................31
5.1.2.1 IPv4 -- Header Construction for Tunnel Mode...........31
5.1.2.2 IPv6 -- Header Construction for Tunnel Mode...........32
5.2 Processing Inbound IP Traffic...................................33
5.2.1 Selecting and Using an SA or SA Bundle.....................33
5.2.2 Handling of AH and ESP tunnels.............................34
6. ICMP Processing (relevant to IPsec)................................35
6.1 PMTU/DF Processing..............................................36
6.1.1 DF Bit.....................................................36
6.1.2 Path MTU Discovery (PMTU)..................................36
6.1.2.1 Propagation of PMTU...................................36
6.1.2.2 Calculation of PMTU...................................37
6.1.2.3 Granularity of PMTU Processing........................37
6.1.2.4 PMTU Aging............................................38
7. Auditing...........................................................39
8. Use in Systems Supporting Information Flow Security................39
8.1 Relationship Between Security Associations and Data Sensitivity.40
8.2 Sensitivity Consistency Checking................................40
8.3 Additional MLS Attributes for Security Association Databases....41
8.4 Additional Inbound Processing Steps for MLS Networking..........41
8.5 Additional Outbound Processing Steps for MLS Networking.........41
8.6 Additional MLS Processing for Security Gateways.................42
9. Performance Issues.................................................42
10. Conformance Requirements..........................................43
11. Security Considerations...........................................43
12. Differences from RFC1825.........................................43
Acknowledgements......................................................44
Appendix A -- Glossary................................................45
Appendix B -- Analysis/Discussion of PMTU/DF/Fragmentation Issues.....48
B.1 DF bit..........................................................48
B.2 Fragmentation...................................................48
B.3 Path MTU Discovery..............................................52
B.3.1 Identifying the Originating Host(s)........................53
B.3.2 Calculation of PMTU........................................55
B.3.3 Granularity of Maintaining PMTU Data.......................56
B.3.4 Per Socket Maintenance of PMTU Data........................57
B.3.5 Delivery of PMTU Data to the Transport Layer...............57
B.3.6 Aging of PMTU Data.........................................57
Appendix C -- Sequence Space Window Code Example......................58
Appendix D -- Categorization of ICMP messages.........................60
References............................................................63
Disclaimer............................................................64
Author Information....................................................65
Full Copyright Statement..............................................66
1. Introduction
1.1 Summary of Contents of Document
This memo specifies the base architecture for IPsec compliant
systems. The goal of the architecture is to provide various security
services for traffic at the IP layer, in both the IPv4 and IPv6
environments. This document describes the goals of such systems,
their components and how they fit together with each other and into
the IP environment. It also describes the security services offered
by the IPsec protocols, and how these services can be employed in the
IP environment. This document does not address all ASPects of IPsec
architecture. Subsequent documents will address additional
architectural details of a more advanced nature, e.g., use of IPsec
in NAT environments and more complete support for IP multicast. The
following fundamental components of the IPsec security architecture
are discussed in terms of their underlying, required functionality.
Additional RFCs (see Section 1.3 for pointers to other documents)
define the protocols in (a), (c), and (d).
a. Security Protocols -- Authentication Header (AH) and
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)
b. Security Associations -- what they are and how they work,
how they are managed, associated processing
c. Key Management -- manual and automatic (The Internet Key
Exchange (IKE))
d. Algorithms for authentication and encryption
This document is not an overall Security Architecture for the
Internet; it addresses security only at the IP layer, provided
through the use of a combination of cryptographic and protocol
security mechanisms.
The keyWords MUST, MUST NOT, REQUIRED, SHALL, SHALL NOT, SHOULD,
SHOULD NOT, RECOMMENDED, MAY, and OPTIONAL, when they appear in this
document, are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119 [Bra97].
1.2 Audience
The target audience for this document includes implementers of this
IP security technology and others interested in gaining a general
background understanding of this system. In particular, prospective
users of this technology (end users or system administrators) are
part of the target audience. A glossary is provided as an appendix
to help fill in gaps in background/vocabulary. This document assumes
that the reader is familiar with the Internet Protocol, related
networking technology, and general security terms and concepts.
1.3 Related Documents
As mentioned above, other documents provide detailed definitions of
some of the components of IPsec and of their inter-relationship.
They include RFCs on the following topics:
a. "IP Security Document Roadmap" [TDG97] -- a document
providing guidelines for specifications describing encryption
and authentication algorithms used in this system.
b. security protocols -- RFCs describing the Authentication
Header (AH) [KA98a] and Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)
[KA98b] protocols.
c. algorithms for authentication and encryption -- a separate
RFCfor each algorithm.
d. automatic key management -- RFCs on "The Internet Key
Exchange (IKE)" [HC98], "Internet Security Association and
Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP)" [MSST97],"The OAKLEY Key
Determination Protocol" [Orm97], and "The Internet IP
Security Domain of Interpretation for ISAKMP" [Pip98].
2. Design Objectives
2.1 Goals/Objectives/Requirements/Problem Description
IPsec is designed to provide interoperable, high quality,
cryptographically-based security for IPv4 and IPv6. The set of
security services offered includes Access control, connectionless
integrity, data origin authentication, protection against replays (a
form of partial sequence integrity), confidentiality (encryption),
and limited traffic flow confidentiality. These services are
provided at the IP layer, offering protection for IP and/or upper
layer protocols.
These objectives are met through the use of two traffic security
protocols, the Authentication Header (AH) and the Encapsulating
Security Payload (ESP), and through the use of cryptographic key
management procedures and protocols. The set of IPsec protocols
employed in any context, and the ways in which they are employed,
will be determined by the security and system requirements of users,
applications, and/or sites/organizations.
When these mechanisms are correctly implemented and deployed, they
ought not to adversely affect users, hosts, and other Internet
components that do not employ these security mechanisms for
protection of their traffic. These mechanisms also are designed to
be algorithm-independent. This modularity permits selection of
different sets of algorithms without affecting the other parts of the
implementation. For example, different user communities may select
different sets of algorithms (creating cliques) if required.
A standard set of default algorithms is specified to facilitate
interoperability in the global Internet. The use of these
algorithms, in conjunction with IPsec traffic protection and key
management protocols, is intended to permit system and application
developers to deploy high quality, Internet layer, cryptographic
security technology.
2.2 Caveats and Assumptions
The suite of IPsec protocols and associated default algorithms are
designed to provide high quality security for Internet traffic.
However, the security offered by use of these protocols ultimately
depends on the quality of the their implementation, which is outside
the scope of this set of standards. Moreover, the security of a
computer system or network is a function of many factors, including
personnel, physical, procedural, compromising emanations, and
computer security practices. Thus IPsec is only one part of an
overall system security architecture.
Finally, the security afforded by the use of IPsec is critically
dependent on many aspects of the operating environment in which the
IPsec implementation executes. For example, defects in OS security,
poor quality of random number sources, sloppy system management
protocols and practices, etc. can all degrade the security provided
by IPsec. As above, none of these environmental attributes are
within the scope of this or other IPsec standards.
3. System Overview
This section provides a high level description of how IPsec works,
the components of the system, and how they fit together to provide
the security services noted above. The goal of this description is
to enable the reader to "picture" the overall process/system, see how
it fits into the IP environment, and to provide context for later
sections of this document, which describe each of the components in
more detail.
An IPsec implementation operates in a host or a security gateway
environment, affording protection to IP traffic. The protection
offered is based on requirements defined by a Security Policy
Database (SPD) established and maintained by a user or system
administrator, or by an application operating within constraints
established by either of the above. In general, packets are selected
for one of three processing modes based on IP and transport layer
header information (Selectors, Section 4.4.2) matched against entries
in the database (SPD). Each packet is either afforded IPsec security
services, discarded, or allowed to bypass IPsec, based on the
applicable database policies identified by the Selectors.
3.1 What IPsec Does
IPsec provides security services at the IP layer by enabling a system
to select required security protocols, determine the algorithm(s) to
use for the service(s), and put in place any cryptographic keys
required to provide the requested services. IPsec can be used to
protect one or more "paths" between a pair of hosts, between a pair
of security gateways, or between a security gateway and a host. (The
term "security gateway" is used throughout the IPsec documents to
refer to an intermediate system that implements IPsec protocols. For
example, a router or a firewall implementing IPsec is a security
gateway.)
The set of security services that IPsec can provide includes access
control, connectionless integrity, data origin authentication,
rejection of replayed packets (a form of partial sequence integrity),
confidentiality (encryption), and limited traffic flow
confidentiality. Because these services are provided at the IP
layer, they can be used by any higher layer protocol, e.g., TCP, UDP,
ICMP, BGP, etc.
The IPsec DOI also supports negotiation of IP compression [SMPT98],
motivated in part by the observation that when encryption is employed
within IPsec, it prevents effective compression by lower protocol
layers.
3.2 How IPsec Works
IPsec uses two protocols to provide traffic security --
Authentication Header (AH) and Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP).
Both protocols are described in more detail in their respective RFCs
[KA98a, KA98b].
o The IP Authentication Header (AH) [KA98a] provides
connectionless integrity, data origin authentication, and an
optional anti-replay service.
o The Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol [KA98b] may
provide confidentiality (encryption), and limited traffic flow
confidentiality. It also may provide connectionless
integrity, data origin authentication, and an anti-replay
service. (One or the other set of these security services
must be applied whenever ESP is invoked.)
o Both AH and ESP are vehicles for access control, based on the
distribution of cryptographic keys and the management of
traffic flows relative to these security protocols.
These protocols may be applied alone or in combination with each
other to provide a desired set of security services in IPv4 and IPv6.
Each protocol supports two modes of use: transport mode and tunnel
mode. In transport mode the protocols provide protection primarily
for upper layer protocols; in tunnel mode, the protocols are applied
to tunneled IP packets. The differences between the two modes are
discussed in Section 4.
IPsec allows the user (or system administrator) to control the
granularity at which a security service is offered. For example, one
can create a single encrypted tunnel to carry all the traffic between
two security gateways or a separate encrypted tunnel can be created
for each TCP connection between each pair of hosts communicating
across these gateways. IPsec management must incorporate facilities
for specifying:
o which security services to use and in what combinations
o the granularity at which a given security protection should be
applied
o the algorithms used to effect cryptographic-based security
Because these security services use shared secret values
(cryptographic keys), IPsec relies on a separate set of mechanisms
for putting these keys in place. (The keys are used for
authentication/integrity and encryption services.) This document
requires support for both manual and automatic distribution of keys.
It specifies a specific public-key based approach (IKE -- [MSST97,
Orm97, HC98]) for automatic key management, but other automated key
distribution techniques MAY be used. For example, KDC-based systems
such as Kerberos and other public-key systems such as SKIP could be
employed.
3.3 Where IPsec May Be Implemented
There are several ways in which IPsec may be implemented in a host or
in conjunction with a router or firewall (to create a security
gateway). Several common examples are provided below:
a. Integration of IPsec into the native IP implementation. This
requires access to the IP source code and is applicable to
both hosts and security gateways.
b. "Bump-in-the-stack" (BITS) implementations, where IPsec is
implemented "underneath" an existing implementation of an IP
protocol stack, between the native IP and the local network
drivers. Source code access for the IP stack is not required
in this context, making this implementation approach
appropriate for use with legacy systems. This approach, when
it is adopted, is usually employed in hosts.
c. The use of an outboard crypto processor is a common design
feature of network security systems used by the military, and
of some commercial systems as well. It is sometimes referred
to as a "Bump-in-the-wire" (BITW) implementation. Such
implementations may be designed to serve either a host or a
gateway (or both). Usually the BITW device is IP
addressable. When supporting a single host, it may be quite
analogous to a BITS implementation, but in supporting a
router or firewall, it must operate like a security gateway.
4. Security Associations
This section defines Security Association management requirements for
all IPv6 implementations and for those IPv4 implementations that
implement AH, ESP, or both. The concept of a "Security Association"
(SA) is fundamental to IPsec. Both AH and ESP make use of SAs and a
major function of IKE is the establishment and maintenance of
Security Associations. All implementations of AH or ESP MUST support
the concept of a Security Association as described below. The
remainder of this section describes various aspects of Security
Association management, defining required characteristics for SA
policy management, traffic processing, and SA management techniques.
4.1 Definition and Scope
A Security Association (SA) is a simplex "connection" that affords
security services to the traffic carried by it. Security services
are afforded to an SA by the use of AH, or ESP, but not both. If
both AH and ESP protection is applied to a traffic stream, then two
(or more) SAs are created to afford protection to the traffic stream.
To secure typical, bi-directional communication between two hosts, or
between two security gateways, two Security Associations (one in each
direction) are required.
A security association is uniquely identified by a triple consisting
of a Security Parameter Index (SPI), an IP Destination Address, and a
security protocol (AH or ESP) identifier. In principle, the
Destination Address may be a unicast address, an IP broadcast
address, or a multicast group address. However, IPsec SA management
mechanisms currently are defined only for unicast SAs. Hence, in the
discussions that follow, SAs will be described in the context of
point-to-point communication, even though the concept is applicable
in the point-to-multipoint case as well.
As noted above, two types of SAs are defined: transport mode and
tunnel mode. A transport mode SA is a security association between
two hosts. In IPv4, a transport mode security protocol header
appears immediately after the IP header and any options, and before
any higher layer protocols (e.g., TCP or UDP). In IPv6, the security
protocol header appears after the base IP header and extensions, but
may appear before or after destination options, and before higher
layer protocols. In the case of ESP, a transport mode SA provides
security services only for these higher layer protocols, not for the
IP header or any extension headers preceding the ESP header. In the
case of AH, the protection is also extended to selected portions of
the IP header, selected portions of extension headers, and selected
options (contained in the IPv4 header, IPv6 Hop-by-Hop extension
header, or IPv6 Destination extension headers). For more details on
the coverage afforded by AH, see the AH specification [KA98a].
A tunnel mode SA is essentially an SA applied to an IP tunnel.
Whenever either end of a security association is a security gateway,
the SA MUST be tunnel mode. Thus an SA between two security gateways
is always a tunnel mode SA, as is an SA between a host and a security
gateway. Note that for the case where traffic is destined for a
security gateway, e.g., SNMP commands, the security gateway is acting
as a host and transport mode is allowed. But in that case, the
security gateway is not acting as a gateway, i.e., not transiting
traffic. Two hosts MAY establish a tunnel mode SA between
themselves. The requirement for any (transit traffic) SA involving a
security gateway to be a tunnel SA arises due to the need to avoid
potential problems with regard to fragmentation and reassembly of
IPsec packets, and in circumstances where multiple paths (e.g., via
different security gateways) exist to the same destination behind the
security gateways.
For a tunnel mode SA, there is an "outer" IP header that specifies
the IPsec processing destination, plus an "inner" IP header that
specifies the (apparently) ultimate destination for the packet. The
security protocol header appears after the outer IP header, and
before the inner IP header. If AH is employed in tunnel mode,
portions of the outer IP header are afforded protection (as above),
as well as all of the tunneled IP packet (i.e., all of the inner IP
header is protected, as well as higher layer protocols). If ESP is
employed, the protection is afforded only to the tunneled packet, not
to the outer header.
In summary,
a) A host MUST support both transport and tunnel mode.
b) A security gateway is required to support only tunnel
mode. If it supports transport mode, that should be used
only when the security gateway is acting as a host, e.g.,
for network management.
4.2 Security Association Functionality
The set of security services offered by an SA depends on the security
protocol selected, the SA mode, the endpoints of the SA, and on the
election of optional services within the protocol. For example, AH
provides data origin authentication and connectionless integrity for
IP datagrams (hereafter referred to as just "authentication"). The
"precision" of the authentication service is a function of the
granularity of the security association with which AH is employed, as
discussed in Section 4.4.2, "Selectors".
AH also offers an anti-replay (partial sequence integrity) service at
the discretion of the receiver, to help counter denial of service
attacks. AH is an appropriate protocol to employ when
confidentiality is not required (or is not permitted, e.g , due to
government restrictions on use of encryption). AH also provides
authentication for selected portions of the IP header, which may be
necessary in some contexts. For example, if the integrity of an IPv4
option or IPv6 extension header must be protected en route between
sender and receiver, AH can provide this service (except for the
non-predictable but mutable parts of the IP header.)
ESP optionally provides confidentiality for traffic. (The strength
of the confidentiality service depends in part, on the encryption
algorithm employed.) ESP also may optionally provide authentication
(as defined above). If authentication is negotiated for an ESP SA,
the receiver also may elect to enforce an anti-replay service with
the same features as the AH anti-replay service. The scope of the
authentication offered by ESP is narrower than for AH, i.e., the IP
header(s) "outside" the ESP header is(are) not protected. If only
the upper layer protocols need to be authenticated, then ESP
authentication is an appropriate choice and is more space efficient
than use of AH encapsulating ESP. Note that although both
confidentiality and authentication are optional, they cannot both be
omitted. At least one of them MUST be selected.
If confidentiality service is selected, then an ESP (tunnel mode) SA
between two security gateways can offer partial traffic flow
confidentiality. The use of tunnel mode allows the inner IP headers
to be encrypted, concealing the identities of the (ultimate) traffic
source and destination. Moreover, ESP payload padding also can be
invoked to hide the size of the packets, further concealing the
external characteristics of the traffic. Similar traffic flow
confidentiality services may be offered when a mobile user is
assigned a dynamic IP address in a dialup context, and establishes a
(tunnel mode) ESP SA to a corporate firewall (acting as a security
gateway). Note that fine granularity SAs generally are more
vulnerable to traffic analysis than coarse granularity ones which are
carrying traffic from many subscribers.
4.3 Combining Security Associations
The IP datagrams transmitted over an individual SA are afforded
protection by exactly one security protocol, either AH or ESP, but
not both. Sometimes a security policy may call for a combination of
services for a particular traffic flow that is not achievable with a
single SA. In such instances it will be necessary to employ multiple
SAs to implement the required security policy. The term "security
association bundle" or "SA bundle" is applied to a sequence of SAs
through which traffic must be processed to satisfy a security policy.
The order of the sequence is defined by the policy. (Note that the
SAs that comprise a bundle may terminate at different endpoints. For
example, one SA may extend between a mobile host and a security
gateway and a second, nested SA may extend to a host behind the
gateway.)
Security associations may be combined into bundles in two ways:
transport adjacency and iterated tunneling.
o Transport adjacency refers to applying more than one
security protocol to the same IP datagram, without invoking
tunneling. This approach to combining AH and ESP allows
for only one level of combination; further nesting yields
no added benefit (assuming use of adequately strong
algorithms in each protocol) since the processing is
performed at one IPsec instance at the (ultimate)
destination.
Host 1 --- Security ---- Internet -- Security --- Host 2
Gwy 1 Gwy 2

-----Security Association 1 (ESP transport)-------

-------Security Association 2 (AH transport)----------
o Iterated tunneling refers to the application of multiple
layers of security protocols effected through IP tunneling.
This approach allows for multiple levels of nesting, since
each tunnel can originate or terminate at a different IPsec
site along the path. No special treatment is eXPected for
ISAKMP traffic at intermediate security gateways other than
what can be specified through appropriate SPD entries (See
Case 3 in Section 4.5)
There are 3 basic cases of iterated tunneling -- support is
required only for cases 2 and 3.:
1. both endpoints for the SAs are the same -- The inner and
outer tunnels could each be either AH or ESP, though it
is unlikely that Host 1 would specify both to be the
same, i.e., AH inside of AH or ESP inside of ESP.
Host 1 --- Security ---- Internet -- Security --- Host 2
Gwy 1 Gwy 2

-------Security Association 1 (tunnel)----------

---------Security Association 2 (tunnel)--------------
2. one endpoint of the SAs is the same -- The inner and
uter tunnels could each be either AH or ESP.
Host 1 --- Security ---- Internet -- Security --- Host 2
Gwy 1 Gwy 2

----Security Association 1 (tunnel)----

---------Security Association 2 (tunnel)-------------
3. neither endpoint is the same -- The inner and outer
tunnels could each be either AH or ESP.
Host 1 --- Security ---- Internet -- Security --- Host 2
Gwy 1 Gwy 2

--Security Assoc 1 (tunnel)-

-----------Security Association 2 (tunnel)-----------
These two approaches also can be combined, e.g., an SA bundle could
be constructed from one tunnel mode SA and one or two transport mode
SAs, applied in sequence. (See Section 4.5 "Basic Combinations of
Security Associations.") Note that nested tunnels can also occur
where neither the source nor the destination endpoints of any of the
tunnels are the same. In that case, there would be no host or
security gateway with a bundle corresponding to the nested tunnels.
For transport mode SAs, only one ordering of security protocols seems
appropriate. AH is applied to both the upper layer protocols and
(parts of) the IP header. Thus if AH is used in a transport mode, in
conjunction with ESP, AH SHOULD appear as the first header after IP,
prior to the appearance of ESP. In that context, AH is applied to
the ciphertext output of ESP. In contrast, for tunnel mode SAs, one
can imagine uses for various orderings of AH and ESP. The required
set of SA bundle types that MUST be supported by a compliant IPsec
implementation is described in Section 4.5.
4.4 Security Association Databases
Many of the details associated with processing IP traffic in an IPsec
implementation are largely a local matter, not subject to
standardization. However, some external aspects of the processing
must be standardized, to ensure interoperability and to provide a
minimum management capability that is essential for productive use of
IPsec. This section describes a general model for processing IP
traffic relative to security associations, in support of these
interoperability and functionality goals. The model described below
is nominal; compliant implementations need not match details of this
model as presented, but the external behavior of such implementations
must be mappable to the externally observable characteristics of this
model.
There are two nominal databases in this model: the Security Policy
Database and the Security Association Database. The former specifies
the policies that determine the disposition of all IP traffic inbound
or outbound from a host, security gateway, or BITS or BITW IPsec
implementation. The latter database contains parameters that are
associated with each (active) security association. This section
also defines the concept of a Selector, a set of IP and upper layer
protocol field values that is used by the Security Policy Database to
map traffic to a policy, i.e., an SA (or SA bundle).
Each interface for which IPsec is enabled requires nominally separate
inbound vs. outbound databases (SAD and SPD), because of the
directionality of many of the fields that are used as selectors.
Typically there is just one such interface, for a host or security
gateway (SG). Note that an SG would always have at least 2
interfaces, but the "internal" one to the corporate net, usually
would not have IPsec enabled and so only one pair of SADs and one
pair of SPDs would be needed. On the other hand, if a host had
multiple interfaces or an SG had multiple external interfaces, it
might be necessary to have separate SAD and SPD pairs for each
interface.
4.4.1 The Security Policy Database (SPD)
Ultimately, a security association is a management construct used to
enforce a security policy in the IPsec environment. Thus an
essential element of SA processing is an underlying Security Policy
Database (SPD) that specifies what services are to be offered to IP
datagrams and in what fashion. The form of the database and its
interface are outside the scope of this specification. However, this
section does specify certain minimum management functionality that
must be provided, to allow a user or system administrator to control
how IPsec is applied to traffic transmitted or received by a host or
transiting a security gateway.
The SPD must be consulted during the processing of all traffic
(INBOUND and OUTBOUND), including non-IPsec traffic. In order to
support this, the SPD requires distinct entries for inbound and
outbound traffic. One can think of this as separate SPDs (inbound
vs. outbound). In addition, a nominally separate SPD must be
provided for each IPsec-enabled interface.
An SPD must discriminate among traffic that is afforded IPsec
protection and traffic that is allowed to bypass IPsec. This applies
to the IPsec protection to be applied by a sender and to the IPsec
protection that must be present at the receiver. For any outbound or
inbound datagram, three processing choices are possible: discard,
bypass IPsec, or apply IPsec. The first choice refers to traffic
that is not allowed to exit the host, traverse the security gateway,
or be delivered to an application at all. The second choice refers
to traffic that is allowed to pass without additional IPsec
protection. The third choice refers to traffic that is afforded
IPsec protection, and for such traffic the SPD must specify the
security services to be provided, protocols to be employed,
algorithms to be used, etc.
For every IPsec implementation, there MUST be an administrative
interface that allows a user or system administrator to manage the
SPD. Specifically, every inbound or outbound packet is subject to
processing by IPsec and the SPD must specify what action will be
taken in each case. Thus the administrative interface must allow the
user (or system administrator) to specify the security processing to
be applied to any packet entering or exiting the system, on a packet
by packet basis. (In a host IPsec implementation making use of a
socket interface, the SPD may not need to be consulted on a per
packet basis, but the effect is still the same.) The management
interface for the SPD MUST allow creation of entries consistent with
the selectors defined in Section 4.4.2, and MUST support (total)
ordering of these entries. It is expected that through the use of
wildcards in various selector fields, and because all packets on a
single UDP or TCP connection will tend to match a single SPD entry,
this requirement will not impose an unreasonably detailed level of
SPD specification. The selectors are analogous to what are found in
a stateless firewall or filtering router and which are currently
manageable this way.
In host systems, applications MAY be allowed to select what security
processing is to be applied to the traffic they generate and consume.
(Means of signalling such requests to the IPsec implementation are
outside the scope of this standard.) However, the system
administrator MUST be able to specify whether or not a user or
application can override (default) system policies. Note that
application specified policies may satisfy system requirements, so
that the system may not need to do additional IPsec processing beyond
that needed to meet an application"s requirements. The form of the
management interface is not specified by this document and may differ
for hosts vs. security gateways, and within hosts the interface may
differ for socket-based vs. BITS implementations. However, this
document does specify a standard set of SPD elements that all IPsec
implementations MUST support.
The SPD contains an ordered list of policy entries. Each policy
entry is keyed by one or more selectors that define the set of IP
traffic encompassed by this policy entry. (The required selector
types are defined in Section 4.4.2.) These define the granularity of
policies or SAs. Each entry includes an indication of whether
traffic matching this policy will be bypassed, discarded, or subject
to IPsec processing. If IPsec processing is to be applied, the entry
includes an SA (or SA bundle) specification, listing the IPsec
protocols, modes, and algorithms to be employed, including any
nesting requirements. For example, an entry may call for all
matching traffic to be protected by ESP in transport mode using
3DES-CBC with an explicit IV, nested inside of AH in tunnel mode
using HMAC/SHA-1. For each selector, the policy entry specifies how
to derive the corresponding values for a new Security Association
Database (SAD, see Section 4.4.3) entry from those in the SPD and the
packet (Note that at present, ranges are only supported for IP
addresses; but wildcarding can be expressed for all selectors):
a. use the value in the packet itself -- This will limit use
of the SA to those packets which have this packet"s value
for the selector even if the selector for the policy entry
has a range of allowed values or a wildcard for this
selector.
b. use the value associated with the policy entry -- If this
were to be just a single value, then there would be no
difference between (b) and (a). However, if the allowed
values for the selector are a range (for IP addresses) or
wildcard, then in the case of a range,(b) would enable use
of the SA by any packet with a selector value within the
range not just by packets with the selector value of the
packet that triggered the creation of the SA. In the case
of a wildcard, (b) would allow use of the SA by packets
with any value for this selector.
For example, suppose there is an SPD entry where the allowed value
for source address is any of a range of hosts (192.168.2.1 to
192.168.2.10). And suppose that a packet is to be sent that has a
source address of 192.168.2.3. The value to be used for the SA could
be any of the sample values below depending on what the policy entry
for this selector says is the source of the selector value:
source for the example of
value to be new SAD
used in the SA selector value
--------------- ------------
a. packet 192.168.2.3 (one host)
b. SPD entry 192.168.2.1 to 192.168.2.10 (range of hosts)
Note that if the SPD entry had an allowed value of wildcard for the
source address, then the SAD selector value could be wildcard (any
host). Case (a) can be used to prohibit sharing, even among packets
that match the same SPD entry.
As described below in Section 4.4.3, selectors may include "wildcard"
entries and hence the selectors for two entries may overlap. (This
is analogous to the overlap that arises with ACLs or filter entries
in routers or packet filtering firewalls.) Thus, to ensure
consistent, predictable processing, SPD entries MUST be ordered and
the SPD MUST always be searched in the same order, so that the first
matching entry is consistently selected. (This requirement is
necessary as the effect of processing traffic against SPD entries
must be deterministic, but there is no way to canonicalize SPD
entries given the use of wildcards for some selectors.) More detail
on matching of packets against SPD entries is provided in Section 5.
Note that if ESP is specified, either (but not both) authentication
or encryption can be omitted. So it MUST be possible to configure
the SPD value for the authentication or encryption algorithms to be
"NULL". However, at least one of these services MUST be selected,
i.e., it MUST NOT be possible to configure both of them as "NULL".
The SPD can be used to map traffic to specific SAs or SA bundles.
Thus it can function both as the reference database for security
policy and as the map to existing SAs (or SA bundles). (To
accommodate the bypass and discard policies cited above, the SPD also
MUST provide a means of mapping traffic to these functions, even
though they are not, per se, IPsec processing.) The way in which the
SPD operates is different for inbound vs. outbound traffic and it
also may differ for host vs. security gateway, BITS, and BITW
implementations. Sections 5.1 and 5.2 describe the use of the SPD
for outbound and inbound processing, respectively.
Because a security policy may require that more than one SA be
applied to a specified set of traffic, in a specific order, the
policy entry in the SPD must preserve these ordering requirements,
when present. Thus, it must be possible for an IPsec implementation
to determine that an outbound or inbound packet must be processed
thorough a sequence of SAs. Conceptually, for outbound processing,
one might imagine links (to the SAD) from an SPD entry for which
there are active SAs, and each entry would consist of either a single
SA or an ordered list of SAs that comprise an SA bundle. When a
packet is matched against an SPD entry and there is an existing SA or
SA bundle that can be used to carry the traffic, the processing of
the packet is controlled by the SA or SA bundle entry on the list.
For an inbound IPsec packet for which multiple IPsec SAs are to be
applied, the lookup based on destination address, IPsec protocol, and
SPI should identify a single SA.
The SPD is used to control the flow of ALL traffic through an IPsec
system, including security and key management traffic (e.g., ISAKMP)
from/to entities behind a security gateway. This means that ISAKMP
traffic must be explicitly accounted for in the SPD, else it will be
discarded. Note that a security gateway could prohibit traversal of
encrypted packets in various ways, e.g., having a DISCARD entry in
the SPD for ESP packets or providing proxy key exchange. In the
latter case, the traffic would be internally routed to the key
management module in the security gateway.
4.4.2 Selectors
An SA (or SA bundle) may be fine-grained or coarse-grained, depending
on the selectors used to define the set of traffic for the SA. For
example, all traffic between two hosts may be carried via a single
SA, and afforded a uniform set of security services. Alternatively,
traffic between a pair of hosts might be spread over multiple SAs,
depending on the applications being used (as defined by the Next
Protocol and Port fields), with different security services offered
by different SAs. Similarly, all traffic between a pair of security
gateways could be carried on a single SA, or one SA could be assigned
for each communicating host pair. The following selector parameters
MUST be supported for SA management to facilitate control of SA
granularity. Note that in the case of receipt of a packet with an
ESP header, e.g., at an encapsulating security gateway or BITW
implementation, the transport layer protocol, source/destination
ports, and Name (if present) may be "OPAQUE", i.e., inaccessible
because of encryption or fragmentation. Note also that both Source
and Destination addresses should either be IPv4 or IPv6.
- Destination IP Address (IPv4 or IPv6): this may be a single IP
address (unicast, anycast, broadcast (IPv4 only), or multicast
group), a range of addresses (high and low values (inclusive),
address + mask, or a wildcard address. The last three are used
to support more than one destination system sharing the same SA
(e.g., behind a security gateway). Note that this selector is
conceptually different from the "Destination IP Address" field
in the <Destination IP Address, IPsec Protocol, SPI> tuple used
to uniquely identify an SA. When a tunneled packet arrives at
the tunnel endpoint, its SPI/Destination address/Protocol are
used to look up the SA for this packet in the SAD. This
destination address comes from the encapsulating IP header.
Once the packet has been processed according to the tunnel SA
and has come out of the tunnel, its selectors are "looked up" in
the Inbound SPD. The Inbound SPD has a selector called
destination address. This IP destination address is the one in
the inner (encapsulated) IP header. In the case of a
transport"d packet, there will be only one IP header and this
ambiguity does not exist. [REQUIRED for all implementations]
- Source IP Address(es) (IPv4 or IPv6): this may be a single IP
address (unicast, anycast, broadcast (IPv4 only), or multicast
group), range of addresses (high and low values inclusive),
address + mask, or a wildcard address. The last three are used
to support more than one source system sharing the same SA
(e.g., behind a security gateway or in a multihomed host).
[REQUIRED for all implementations]
- Name: There are 2 cases (Note that these name forms are
supported in the IPsec DOI.)
1. User ID
a. a fully qualified user name string (DNS), e.g.,
mozart@foo.bar.com
b. X.500 distinguished name, e.g., C = US, SP = MA,
O = GTE Internetworking, CN = Stephen T. Kent.
2. System name (host, security gateway, etc.)
a. a fully qualified DNS name, e.g., foo.bar.com
b. X.500 distinguished name
c. X.500 general name
NOTE: One of the possible values of this selector is "OPAQUE".
[REQUIRED for the following cases. Note that support for name
forms other than addresses is not required for manually keyed
SAs.
o User ID
- native host implementations
- BITW and BITS implementations acting as HOSTS
with only one user
- security gateway implementations for INBOUND
processing.
o System names -- all implementations]
- Data sensitivity level: (IPSO/CIPSO labels)
[REQUIRED for all systems providing information flow security as
per Section 8, OPTIONAL for all other systems.]
- Transport Layer Protocol: OBTained from the IPv4 "Protocol" or
the IPv6 "Next Header" fields. This may be an individual
protocol number. These packet fields may not contain the
Transport Protocol due to the presence of IP extension headers,
e.g., a Routing Header, AH, ESP, Fragmentation Header,
Destination Options, Hop-by-hop options, etc. Note that the
Transport Protocol may not be available in the case of receipt
of a packet with an ESP header, thus a value of "OPAQUE" SHOULD
be supported.
[REQUIRED for all implementations]
NOTE: To locate the transport protocol, a system has to chain
through the packet headers checking the "Protocol" or "Next
Header" field until it encounters either one it recognizes as a
transport protocol, or until it reaches one that isn"t on its
list of extension headers, or until it encounters an ESP header
that renders the transport protocol opaque.
- Source and Destination (e.g., TCP/UDP) Ports: These may be
individual UDP or TCP port values or a wildcard port. (The use
of the Next Protocol field and the Source and/or Destination
Port fields (in conjunction with the Source and/or Destination
Address fields), as an SA selector is sometimes referred to as
"session-oriented keying."). Note that the source and
destination ports may not be available in the case of receipt of
a packet with an ESP header, thus a value of "OPAQUE" SHOULD be
supported.
The following table summarizes the relationship between the
"Next Header" value in the packet and SPD and the derived Port
Selector value for the SPD and SAD.
Next Hdr Transport Layer Derived Port Selector Field
in Packet Protocol in SPD Value in SPD and SAD
-------- --------------- ---------------------------
ESP ESP or ANY ANY (i.e., don"t look at it)
-don"t care- ANY ANY (i.e., don"t look at it)
specific value specific value NOT ANY (i.e., drop packet)
fragment
specific value specific value actual port selector field
not fragment
If the packet has been fragmented, then the port information may
not be available in the current fragment. If so, discard the
fragment. An ICMP PMTU should be sent for the first fragment,
which will have the port information. [MAY be supported]
The IPsec implementation context determines how selectors are used.
For example, a host implementation integrated into the stack may make
use of a socket interface. When a new connection is established the
SPD can be consulted and an SA (or SA bundle) bound to the socket.
Thus traffic sent via that socket need not result in additional
lookups to the SPD/SAD. In contrast, a BITS, BITW, or security
gateway implementation needs to look at each packet and perform an
SPD/SAD lookup based on the selectors. The allowable values for the
selector fields differ between the traffic flow, the security
association, and the security policy.
The following table summarizes the kinds of entries that one needs to
be able to express in the SPD and SAD. It shows how they relate to
the fields in data traffic being subjected to IPsec screening.
(Note: the "wild" or "wildcard" entry for src and dst addresses
includes a mask, range, etc.)
Field Traffic Value SAD Entry SPD Entry
-------- ------------- ---------------- --------------------
src addr single IP addr single,range,wild single,range,wildcard
dst addr single IP addr single,range,wild single,range,wildcard
xpt protocol* xpt protocol single,wildcard single,wildcard
src port* single src port single,wildcard single,wildcard
dst port* single dst port single,wildcard single,wildcard
user id* single user id single,wildcard single,wildcard
sec. labels single value single,wildcard single,wildcard
* The SAD and SPD entries for these fields could be "OPAQUE"
because the traffic value is encrypted.
NOTE: In principle, one could have selectors and/or selector values
in the SPD which cannot be negotiated for an SA or SA bundle.
Examples might include selector values used to select traffic for
discarding or enumerated lists which cause a separate SA to be
created for each item on the list. For now, this is left for future
versions of this document and the list of required selectors and
selector values is the same for the SPD and the SAD. However, it is
acceptable to have an administrative interface that supports use of
selector values which cannot be negotiated provided that it does not
mislead the user into believing it is creating an SA with these
selector values. For example, the interface may allow the user to
specify an enumerated list of values but would result in the creation
of a separate policy and SA for each item on the list. A vendor
might support such an interface to make it easier for its customers
to specify clear and concise policy specifications.
4.4.3 Security Association Database (SAD)
In each IPsec implementation there is a nominal Security Association
Database, in which each entry defines the parameters associated with
one SA. Each SA has an entry in the SAD. For outbound processing,
entries are pointed to by entries in the SPD. Note that if an SPD
entry does not currently point to an SA that is appropriate for the
packet, the implementation creates an appropriate SA (or SA Bundle)
and links the SPD entry to the SAD entry (see Section 5.1.1). For
inbound processing, each entry in the SAD is indexed by a destination
IP address, IPsec protocol type, and SPI. The following parameters
are associated with each entry in the SAD. This description does not
purport to be a MIB, but only a specification of the minimal data
items required to support an SA in an IPsec implementation.
For inbound processing: The following packet fields are used to look
up the SA in the SAD:
o Outer Header"s Destination IP address: the IPv4 or IPv6
Destination address.
[REQUIRED for all implementations]
o IPsec Protocol: AH or ESP, used as an index for SA lookup
in this database. Specifies the IPsec protocol to be
applied to the traffic on this SA.
[REQUIRED for all implementations]
o SPI: the 32-bit value used to distinguish among different
SAs terminating at the same destination and using the same
IPsec protocol.
[REQUIRED for all implementations]
For each of the selectors defined in Section 4.4.2, the SA entry in
the SAD MUST contain the value or values which were negotiated at the
time the SA was created. For the sender, these values are used to
decide whether a given SA is appropriate for use with an outbound
packet. This is part of checking to see if there is an existing SA
that can be used. For the receiver, these values are used to check
that the selector values in an inbound packet match those for the SA
(and thus indirectly those for the matching policy). For the
receiver, this is part of verifying that the SA was appropriate for
this packet. (See Section 6 for rules for ICMP messages.) These
fields can have the form of specific values, ranges, wildcards, or
"OPAQUE" as described in section 4.4.2, "Selectors". Note that for
an ESP SA, the encryption algorithm or the authentication algorithm
could be "NULL". However they MUST not both be "NULL".
The following SAD fields are used in doing IPsec processing:
o Sequence Number Counter: a 32-bit value used to generate the
Sequence Number field in AH or ESP headers.
[REQUIRED for all implementations, but used only for outbound
traffic.]
o Sequence Counter Overflow: a flag indicating whether overflow
of the Sequence Number Counter should generate an auditable
event and prevent transmission of additional packets on the
SA.
[REQUIRED for all implementations, but used only for outbound
traffic.]
o Anti-Replay Window: a 32-bit counter and a bit-map (or
equivalent) used to determine whether an inbound AH or ESP
packet is a replay.
[REQUIRED for all implementations but used only for inbound
traffic. NOTE: If anti-replay has been disabled by the
receiver, e.g., in the case of a manually keyed SA, then the
Anti-Replay Window is not used.]
o AH Authentication algorithm, keys, etc.
[REQUIRED for AH implementations]
o ESP Encryption algorithm, keys, IV mode, IV, etc.
[REQUIRED for ESP implementations]
o ESP authentication algorithm, keys, etc. If the
authentication service is not selected, this field will be
null.
[REQUIRED for ESP implementations]
o Lifetime of this Security Association: a time interval after
which an SA must be replaced with a new SA (and new SPI) or
terminated, plus an indication of which of these actions
should occur. This may be expressed as a time or byte count,
or a simultaneous use of both, the first lifetime to expire
taking precedence. A compliant implementation MUST support
both types of lifetimes, and must support a simultaneous use
of both. If time is employed, and if IKE employs X.509
certificates for SA establishment, the SA lifetime must be
constrained by the validity intervals of the certificates,
and the NextIssueDate of the CRLs used in the IKE exchange
for the SA. Both initiator and responder are responsible for
constraining SA lifetime in this fashion.
[REQUIRED for all implementations]
NOTE: The details of how to handle the refreshing of keys
when SAs expire is a local matter. However, one reasonable
approach is:
(a) If byte count is used, then the implementation
SHOULD count the number of bytes to which the IPsec
algorithm is applied. For ESP, this is the encryption
algorithm (including Null encryption) and for AH,
this is the authentication algorithm. This includes
pad bytes, etc. Note that implementations SHOULD be
able to handle having the counters at the ends of an
SA get out of synch, e.g., because of packet loss or
because the implementations at each end of the SA
aren"t doing things the same way.
(b) There SHOULD be two kinds of lifetime -- a soft
lifetime which warns the implementation to initiate
action such as setting up a replacement SA and a
hard lifetime when the current SA ends.
(c) If the entire packet does not get delivered during
the SAs lifetime, the packet SHOULD be discarded.
o IPsec protocol mode: tunnel, transport or wildcard.
Indicates which mode of AH or ESP is applied to traffic on
this SA. Note that if this field is "wildcard" at the
sending end of the SA, then the application has to specify
the mode to the IPsec implementation. This use of wildcard
allows the same SA to be used for either tunnel or transport
mode traffic on a per packet basis, e.g., by different
sockets. The receiver does not need to know the mode in
order to properly process the packet"s IPsec headers.
[REQUIRED as follows, unless implicitly defined by context:
- host implementations must support all modes
- gateway implementations must support tunnel mode]
NOTE: The use of wildcard for the protocol mode of an inbound
SA may add complexity to the situation in the receiver (host
only). Since the packets on such an SA could be delivered in
either tunnel or transport mode, the security of an incoming
packet could depend in part on which mode had been used to
deliver it. If, as a result, an application cared about the
SA mode of a given packet, then the application would need a
mechanism to obtain this mode information.
o Path MTU: any observed path MTU and aging variables. See
Section 6.1.2.4
[REQUIRED for all implementations but used only for outbound
traffic]
4.5 Basic Combinations of Security Associations
This section describes four examples of combinations of security
associations that MUST be supported by compliant IPsec hosts or
security gateways. Additional combinations of AH and/or ESP in
tunnel and/or transport modes MAY be supported at the discretion of
the implementor. Compliant implementations MUST be capable of
generating these four combinations and on receipt, of processing
them, but SHOULD be able to receive and process any combination. The
diagrams and text below describe the basic cases. The legend for the
diagrams is:
==== = one or more security associations (AH or ESP, transport
or tunnel)
---- = connectivity (or if so labelled, administrative boundary)
Hx = host x
SGx = security gateway x
X* = X supports IPsec
NOTE: The security associations below can be either AH or ESP. The
mode (tunnel vs transport) is determined by the nature of the
endpoints. For host-to-host SAs, the mode can be either transport or
tunnel.
Case 1. The case of providing end-to-end security between 2 hosts
across the Internet (or an Intranet).
====================================

H1* ------ (Inter/Intranet) ------ H2*
Note that either transport or tunnel mode can be selected by the
hosts. So the headers in a packet between H1 and H2 could look
like any of the following:
Transport Tunnel
----------------- ---------------------
1. [IP1][AH][upper] 4. [IP2][AH][IP1][upper]
2. [IP1][ESP][upper] 5. [IP2][ESP][IP1][upper]
3. [IP1][AH][ESP][upper]
Note that there is no requirement to support general nesting,
but in transport mode, both AH and ESP can be applied to the
packet. In this event, the SA establishment procedure MUST
ensure that first ESP, then AH are applied to the packet.
Case 2. This case illustrates simple virtual private networks
support.
===========================

------------------------- --------------------------

H1 -- (Local --- SG1* --- (Internet) --- SG2* --- (Local --- H2
Intranet) Intranet)
-------------------------- ---------------------------
admin. boundary admin. boundary
Only tunnel mode is required here. So the headers in a packet
between SG1 and SG2 could look like either of the following:
Tunnel
---------------------
4. [IP2][AH][IP1][upper]
5. [IP2][ESP][IP1][upper]
Case 3. This case combines cases 1 and 2, adding end-to-end security
between the sending and receiving hosts. It imposes no new
requirements on the hosts or security gateways, other than a
requirement for a security gateway to be configurable to pass
IPsec traffic (including ISAKMP traffic) for hosts behind it.
===============================================================

=========================

------------------------ -------------------------
H1* -- (Local --- SG1* -- (Internet) -- SG2* --- (Local --- H2*
Intranet) Intranet)
-------------------------- ---------------------------
admin. boundary admin. boundary
Case 4. This covers the situation where a remote host (H